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H – 1143

International Court of Justice

Trial Copy

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

BASIC INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION

OF THE

GERMAN ARMED FORCES

Submitted for the
US Chief of Counsel.

26 November, 1945.

H1143-0002

H1143-0003

BASIC INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

In 1933 the top position in the armed forces under Hindenburg was held by von Blomberg, his title being Reich Defence Minister. He had under him as service chiefs von Fritsch with the title of Chief of Army Staff and Raeder with that of Chief of Naval Staff. The Air Force did not yet officially exist.

In May 1935, with the reestablishment of conscription, von Blomberg was upgraded to Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch and Raeder were also upgraded to Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy. The Army Staff and Navy Staff became "High Commands" (OKH and OKM).

The Air Force, which came into the open about this time, was an independent institution under Goering personally. Goering was both Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

In February 1938 there was a general reorganization. Blomberg was retired and his ministry was wound up. Out of the interservice department of the old ministry, the so-called "Armed Forces Department", was formed a new overall interservice authority, the High Command of the Armed Forces, or OKW. It exercised authority over the Air Force to the same extent as over the Army and Navy. The OKW was in effect Hitler's personal staff for armed forces matters and it combined staff and ministerial functions. Its head was Keitel, with the title of Chief of the OKW, and the head of its planning or operationsldepartment was Jodl, with the title of Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Department ("Department" later changed to "Staff"). Jodl's immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the title of Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941.

Raeder survived the 1938 reshuffle but Fritsch was retired as Commander in Chief of the Army and replaced by von Brauchitsch.

After 1938 there were therefore four departments, OKW, OKH, OKM and the Air Force (named OKL only in 1944), and each had its own General Staff. In each case this General Staff was the most important division

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of the department and its chief was, next to the Commander in Chief himself, the most important man in his arm of the services. It will be seen that in this war there was no single General Staff such as there was in World War I.

Later changes in the top commands: von Brauchitsch was replaced as C-in-C of the Army by Hitler himself in December 1941. Raeder was replaced as C-in-C of the Navy by Doenitz in January 1943. For the last month of the war von Greim was C-in-C of the Air Force in the place of Goering.

Under the Army High Command (OKH) were the army field formations. Usually the immediately subordinate formation was known as an "army group" which was a headquarters controlling two or more "armies". In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece where only one army was used, "armies" were directly subordinated to OKH, rather than to an "army group". Under the "armies" came the lower field formations, i.e. corps, divisions, regiments etc.

Under OKL, the immediately subordinate air formation was known as an "Air Fleet" (Luftflotte); the lower units under the Air Fleet were called "corps" (Fliegerkorps or Jagdkorps) or "divisions" (Fliegerdivisionen or Jagddivisionen) etc.

Under the OKM were the "naval group commands", which controlled all naval operations in a given sector, with the exception of the operations of the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature were too mobile to be restricted to an area command. The commanders of the fleet and of the submarines , and certain other specialized units, were directly subordinated to the German Admiralty.

SKIZZE



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The commonest terms with their normal abbreviations and American or English equivalents are:

Amt	Department
Armee	Army (in the sense of specific armies in the field)
Chef	Chief
Führungstab (Füst)	Operations Staff
Generalstab (Genstab)	General Staff
Heeresgruppe (H.Gr.)	Army Group
Heeresleitung	Army Staff
Luftflotte (Lfl)	Air Fleet
Luftwaffe (Lw)	Air Force
Marinegruppenkommando (Mar.Gp.Kdo.)	Naval Group Command
Marineleitung	Naval Staff
Marineoberkommando (MOK)	Naval Chief Command
Militärbefehlshaber (Mil.Bef.)	Military Commander (commanding non-operational troops in occupied territories)
Oberbefehlshaber (OB)	Commander in Chief
Oberkommando	High Command
Oberster Befehlshaber	Supreme Commander
Reichskriegsminister	Reich War Minister
Reichsminister der Luftfahrt (R d L)	Air Minister
Reichswehrminister	Reich Defence Minister
Seekriegsleitung (SKL)	Naval War Staff
Stellvertretender Chef (Stellv. Chef)	Deputy Chief
Wehrmacht	Armed Forces
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber (WB)	Armed Forces Commander (EITHER Supreme Commander for a whole theatre OR Commander responsible for all Armed Forces in an occupied zone)
I A	Operations Officer or section (G3)
I B	Supply Officer or section (G1)
I C	Intelligence Officer or section (G2)

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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF RANKS

German Army	US Army	SS
Generalfeldmarschall	General of the Army	Reichsführer SS (RFSS)
Generaloberst	General	Oberstgruppenführer (Obstgruf)
General (der Inf. etc.)	Lt. General	Obergruppenführer (Ogruf)
Generalleutnant	Major General	Gruppenführer (Gruf)
Generalmajor	Brigadier General	Brigadeführer (Brigf.)
		Oberführer (Oberf.)
Oberst	Colonel	Standartenführer (Standf.)
Oberstleutnant	Lt. Colonel	Obersturmbannführer (Ostubaf)
Major	Major	Sturmbannführer (Stubaf)
Hauptmann	Captain	Hauptsturmführer
Oberleutnant	Lieutenant	Obersturmführer
Leutnant	2nd Lieutenant	Unterführer

German Navy	British Navy
Grossadmiral	Admiral of the Fleet
Generaladmiral	Admiral
Admiral	Admiral
Vizeadmiral	Vice-Admiral
Konteradmiral	Rear-Admiral
Kommodore	Commodore
Kapitän zur See	Captain
Fregattenkapitän	Commander
Korvettenkapitän	Lt. Commander
Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant
Oberleutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant
Leutnant	Midshipman

File Copy.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND

of the

GERMAN ARMED FORCES

Submitted for the
U. S. Chief of Counsel
Dec. 13, 1945

H1143 – 0008

H1143-0009

GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND
of the
GERMAN ARMED FORCES

1. Pursuant to the Tribunal's request, made at its meeting the evening of 11 December with counsel for the prosecution and for the "groups and organizations", the following statement is submitted to the Tribunal and to counsel for the defense. Evidence in support of this statement, embodied in Attachments B and C, is also submitted and offered in evidence to the Tribunal. As was stated to the Tribunal by the Chief Prosecutor for the United States, this statement and evidence is preliminary in character, and the prosecution reserves the right to offer further evidence in support of the charges against the General Staff and High Command in the Indictment.

General Information

2. For the information of the Tribunal, we have prepared a very short exposition of the organization of the German Armed Forces. The material in this exposition is purely descriptive and non-controversial. It is not offered in evidence but is submitted as a brief in aid of the Tribunal's understanding of the subject matter. It is submitted herewith, as Attachment A, in English, Russian and French, and is being made available in German to all counsel for the defense.

Composition of the General Staff and High Command Group

3. The composition of the group, against which the declaration of criminality is requested, is specified in the sixth paragraph of Appendix B of the Indictment. The group comprises about 131 officers, of whom 114 are believed to be

H1143-0010

still living. The composition of the group, and the manner in which it functioned, will be fully developed orally before the Tribunal when the prosecution presents its case against this group. Evidence concerning the composition and functioning of the group is embodied in Affidavits Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 9, which are now offered in evidence, and copies of which are contained in Attachment B, submitted herewith. These affidavits are signed and sworn to by Colonel General Franz Halder, Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, his son, Colonel Bernd von Brauchitsch, and Colonel General Blaskowitz. Further evidence concerning the composition and functioning of the group is contained in documents C-78, 447-PS and 798-PS, all of which have already been put in evidence, and other documents in Attachment C submitted herewith, which are now offered in evidence.

Criminality of the Group -- Counts 1 & 2

4. The sixth paragraph of Appendix B alleges that the General Staff and High Command group "had a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of illegal wars as set forth in Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment." This charge will be fully developed orally when the prosecution's case is presented before the Tribunal. The documents upon which the prosecution will rely have for the most part already been accepted in evidence by the Tribunal. In addition, the prosecution herewith offers in evidence Affidavits Nos. 3 (by Field Marshall von Blomberg) and 5 (by Colonel General Blaskowitz), copies of which are included in Attachment B hereto.

Criminality of the Group -- Counts 3 & 4

5. The sixth paragraph of the Indictment charges that the General Staff and High Command group "had a major responsibility .... for the war crimes and crimes against humanity

H1143-0011

involved in the execution of the common plan or conspiracy set forth in Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment." This charge will be fully developed orally when the prosecution presents its case against the group before the Tribunal. Some of the documents upon which the prosecution will rely in this connection are, or will be, already in evidence before the Tribunal. The prosecution will also rely upon the documents included in Attachment C hereto. The prosecution will also rely upon and herewith offers in evidence Affidavits Nos. 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 24, all of which are included in Attachment B hereto. These affidavits are signed and sworn to by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, Generalleutnant Heusinger, SS Brigadefuehrer Ernst Rode, General of Panzer Troops Hans Roettiger, Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, and SS Gruppenfuehrer Walter Schellenberg.

The Affidavits and Documents

6. The prosecution is offering in evidence the affidavits and documents comprising Attachments B and C at this time in order to meet the Tribunal's request that it be informed in advance of the composition and nature of the groups and organizations charged with criminality, and in order to expedite the proceedings without in any way prejudicing the opportunity of the defendants to test the affidavits by examination or cross-examination of the affiants.

7. A large part of the evidence which the prosecution must present in connection with these groups and organizations, and in connection with the General Staff and High Command in particular, is expository and descriptive in nature. Obviously, the Court must know, and the record must show, the general history, development, structure and functions of these organizations and their various component parts and subdivisions.

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Part of this evidence is available and will be presented through the medium of documents. However, in some cases the best and most complete evidence is contained in affidavits by officials or members of these groups and organizations. The prosecution is prepared to develop all this evidence by calling the affiants as witnesses if the affidavits are not received in evidence. But to develop all this material on the witness stand appears to the prosecution to be unnecessary and unduly time-consuming. Affidavits or statements under oath by responsible officials or by high-ranking officers in the German Armed Forces quite obviously have "probative value" within the meaning of Article 19 of the Charter, and are relevant within the meaning of Article 20.

8. The prosecution believes that the admission in evidence of these affidavits is fully justified under, and indeed is the only result consistent with, the Charter under which this Court is constituted. The prosecution believes that any other result will unduly and unnecessarily protract these proceedings. The Charter provides "The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value." (Article 19.) The purpose of the Charter obviously was to center any dispute on the value of any evidence, not on technical questions of admissibility. It is submitted that the only ground for exclusion of evidence is lack of any probative value or lack of relevance to the issue.

9. As the Tribunal will have seen from the foregoing statement, presentation of the prosecution's case against the General Staff and High Command group will involve the presentation of approximately twenty affidavits from approximately a dozen affiants. All of these affidavits are being made

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available to the Tribunal in English, Russian and French. All of them will be made available to counsel for the defendants in German in the same manner as documents are made available, and with sufficient copies so that each defendant's counsel can have his own. All of the signatories of these statements under oath are available in Nürnberg. Some of them have already been requested as witnesses by counsel for one or more of the defendants. Some of the statements under oath are purely expository and non-controversial. The proceedings before this Tribunal will be greatly expedited if the Tribunal will admit such statements under oath in evidence, with the understanding that counsel for the defendants may call any signatory of such a statement as a witness, for examination within the scope of the statement under oath.

10. The documents comprised in Attachment C hereto are offered in evidence at this time, in advance of oral presentation of the prosecution's case, for the same general purposes as in the case of the affidavits. It should be helpful both to the Tribunal and to counsel for the defendants to have the documents received in evidence prior to oral presentation of the prosecution's case since it will give the Tribunal and defendants counsel more time to familiarize themselves with the contents of the documents.

Robert H. Jackson
U. S. Chief of Counsel

Of Counsel:

TELFORD TAYLOR
Colonel, G.S.C.

Exhibit U.S.A. 531
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.1
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).

The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces

(Signed) HALDER

H1143-0014

CHART

(Initialed) H.



H1143-0015

H1143 - 0016

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General FRANZ HALDER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him and an attached chart initialed by him, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No.1..

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143-0017

AFFIDAVIT No.1

ERKLÄRUNG

Die endgültige Vollzugsgewalt und letzte Verantwortung in militärischen Angelegenheiten in Deutschland war dem Staatsoberhaupte anvertraut, welches vor dem 2. August 1934 Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg und späterhin bis 1945 Adolf Hitler war.

Militärische fachliche Angelegenheiten oblagen der Verantwortung der dem Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht (gleichzeitig Staatsoberhaupt) unterstehenden Wehrmachtteile, das heisst, Heer, Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe. Tatsächlich jedoch wurde die Leitung der Arbeiten innerhalb dieses Sachbereiches von einer relativ kleinen Gruppe höherer Offiziere ausgeübt. Diese Offiziere übten diese leitende Tätigkeit auf Grund ihrer Dienstanweisungen kraft ihrer Ausbildung, Stellung und ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen aus. Pläne für militärische Unternehmungen der deutschen Wehrmacht wurden nach den Weisungen des OKW von diesem Bearbeiterkreis im Auftrag ihrer Befehlshaber vorbereitet und wurden dem Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht (zugleich Staatsoberhaupt) unterbreitet.

Den Angehörigen dieser Gruppe oblag es militärische Unternehmungen innerhalb ihres Sachbereiches vorzubereiten und tatsächlich haben sie solche Unternehmungen vorbereitet, die von der Truppe durchgeführt werden sollten.

Vor einer Unternehmung wurden gelegentlich die betreffenden Angehörigen dieser Gruppe von dem Staatsoberhaupte zusammengerufen und die angemessenen Richtlinien gegeben. Beispiele solcher Zusammenkünfte sind Hitlers Ansprache am 22. August 1939 an die

H1143 - 0018

Oberbefehlshaber vor dem polnischen Feldzug, und am 14. Juni 1941 die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei vor dem ersten russischen Feldzug.

Die Gliederung dieser Gruppe und ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis zueinander zeigt die beiliegende Skizze. Dies war der tatsächliche Generalstab und die Oberste Führung der deutschen Wehrmacht.

gez. Halder

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General FRANZ HALLER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him and an attached chart initialed by him, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp

WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

SKIZZE

(...gez. H...



H1143-0019

Exhibit U.S.A. 532
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No. 2.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNS.

H1143 - 0020

STATEMENT

Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State, who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented by them to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).

The members of this group were vested with full authority to prepare for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as might be undertaken by troops in the field.

Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.

(Signed) von BRAUCHITSCH

CHART



H1143-0021

H1143 - 0022

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN 0-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal WALTER von BRAUCHITSCH, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him, together with an attached chart, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
0-385720

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN 0-454231, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 2.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
0-454231

AFFIDAVIT No.2

H1143-0023

ERKLÄRUNG

Die endgültige Vollzugsgewalt und letzte Verantwortung in militärischen Angelegenheiten in Deutschland war dem Staatsoberhaupte anvertraut, welches vor dem 2. August 1934 Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg und späterhin bis 1945 Adolf Hitler war.

Militärische fachliche Angelegenheiten oblagen der Verantwortung der dem Oberstenbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht (gleichzeitig Staatsoberhaupt) unterstehenden Wehrmachtteile, das heisst, Heer, Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe. Tatsächlich jedoch wurde die Leitung der Arbeiten innerhalb dieses Sachbereiches von einer relativ kleinen Gruppe höherer Offiziere ausgeübt. Diese Offiziere übten diese leitende Tätigkeit auf Grund ihrer Dienstanweisungen kraft ihrer Ausbildung, Stellung und ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen aus. Pläne für militärische Unternehmungen der deutschen Wehrmacht wurden nach den Weisungen des OKW von diesem Bearbeiterkreis vorbereitet und wurden dem Oberstenbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht (zugleich Staatsoberhaupt) unterbreitet.

Den Angehörigen dieser Gruppe war volle Autorität anvertraut militärische Unternehmungen innerhalb ihres Sachbereiches vorzubereiten und tatsächlich haben sie solche Unternehmungen vorbereitet, die von der Truppe evtuell durchgeführt werden sollten.

Vor einer Unternehmung wurden gelegentlich Angehörige dieser Gruppe von dem Staatsoberhaupte zusammengerufen und die angemessenen Richtlinien gegeben. Beispiele solcher

Zusammenkünfte sind Hitlers Ansprache am 22. August 1939 an die Oberbefehlshaber vor dem polnischen Feldzug, und am 14. Juni 1941 die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei vor dem ersten russischen Feldzug.

Die Gliederung dieser Gruppe und ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis zueinander zeigt die beiliegende Skizze. In der Hand der in der Skizze aufgeführten Dienststellen lag die tatsächliche Führung der Wehrmacht.

gez. von Brauchitsch

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal WALTER von BRAUCHITSCH, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him, together with an attached chart, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland

PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143-0024

SKIZZE



H1143 - 0025

Exhibit U.S.A. 536
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.3
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1143 - 0026

STATEMENT

From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.

I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety per cent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.

Before 1938 - 1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced the results which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.

Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a "Chief

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of Staff" under Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.

As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler's measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler's hands for every one of his decisions.

He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.

(Signed) v. BLOMBERG

H1143-0028

CITY OF NUREMBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720 an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal WERNER von BLOMBERG, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No.3.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

AFFIDAVIT No.3

H1143 – 0029

ERKLÄRUNG

Seit 1919 und insbesondere seit 1924 nahmen drei wesentliche Territorialfragen die Aufmerksamkeit Deutschlands in Anspruch. Es waren dies die Fragen des polnischen Korridors, der Ruhr und des Memellandes.

Sowohl ich selbst, als auch die gesamte Gruppe deutscher Stabsoffiziere glaubten, dasz diese drei Fragen, unter welchen die Frage des polnischen Korridors besonders hervortrat, eines Tages gelöst werden müssten, nötigenfalls durch Waffengewalt. Ungefähr neunzig Prozent des deutschen Volkes teilte diese Ansicht mit den Offizieren bezüglich der polnischen Frage. Ein Krieg um die durch die Schaffung des polnischen Korridors entstandene Schmach auszumerzen und die Bedrohung des abgetrennten Ostpreussens, das von Polen und Litauen umfasst war, zu vermindern, wurde als eine heilige Pflicht, wenn auch bittere Notwendigkeit, betrachtet. Dieses war einer der Hauptgründe der teils geheimen Wiederaufrüstung welche ungefähr zehn Jahre vor Hitlers Machtergreifung begann und unter der Naziherrschaft besonders betont wurde.

Vor 1938-1939 waren die deutschen Generäle nicht gegen Hitler eingestellt. Es war kein Grund vorhanden Hitler zu opponieren, da er die Erfolge brachte, welche sie erwünschten. Nach diesem Zeitpunkte begannen einige Generäle seine Methoden zu verabscheuen und misstrauten seiner Urteilskraft. Sie haben jedoch allgemein gefehlt, eine erkennbare Stellung gegen ihn einzunehmen, obwohl einige versuchten es zu tun, und infolgedessen es mit ihrem Leben oder ihrer Position einbüssen mussten.

Kurz vor meiner Absetzung als Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht

im Jahre 1938, ersuchte mich Hitler einen Nachfolger vorzuschlagen. Ich schlug Göring vor, der der dienstälteste Offizier war, aber Hitler erhob Einwand wegen seines Mangels an Geduld und Fleiss. Ich wurde als Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht nicht durch einen Offizier ersetzt sondern Hitler übernahm unmittelbar meine Funktion als Befehlshaber. Keitel wurde von mir als ein Chef du bureau vorgeschlagen. Er wurde meines Wissens niemals zum Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht ernannt, sondern war immer nur ein "Chef des Stabes" unter Hitler, der praktisch die Verwaltungsgeschäfte des Kriegsministeriums führte. Zu meiner Zeit war Keitel nicht gegen Hitler eingestellt und darum geeignet zum guten Einverständnis zwischen Hitler und der Wehrmacht beizutragen, was ich selbst wünschte und als Reichswehrminister und Reichskriegsminister gefördert hatte. Das Gegenteil hätte zu einem Bürgerkrieg geführt, denn damals stand die Masse des deutschen Volkes hinter Hitler. Viele wollen das nicht mehr zugeben. Aber es ist die Wahrheit.

Wie ich hörte, hat Keitel es dann an einem Widerstand gegen jede Massnahme Hitlers fehlen lassen. Er wurde zu einem fügsamen Werkzeug in der Hand Hitlers für jede seiner Entschlüsse.

Er wuchs in eine Stellung hinein, der er nicht gewachsen war.

gez. v. Blomberg

H1143-0030

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN 0-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal WERNER von BLOMBERG, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
0-385720

Exhibit U.S.A. 535
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.4
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended by a change which he desired.

After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details in order to hear their desires and recommendations.

After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relatively small staff which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who exercised jurisdiction.

(Signed) von BRAUCHITSCH

H1143-0031

H1143-0032

SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.

Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKW began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.

During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.

Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.

(Signed) von BRAUCHITSCH

H1143 - 0033

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

[illegible], WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal WALTER von BRAUCHITSCH, to me known who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung vom 7. November 1945" (statement of 7 November 1945) consisting of two pages in the German language, and who in my presence also signed the attached "Erganzung zu meiner Erklärung vom 7. November 1945" (supplement to my statement of 7 November 1945) consisting of one sheet written on both sides in German script, and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No:4.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

AFFIDAVIT No. 4

H1143 – 0034

ERKLÄRUNG VOM 7. NOVEMBER 1945.

Im April 1939 wurde ich von Hitler beauftragt, militärische Vorbereitungen für einen etwaigen Feldzug gegen Polen zu treffen. Sofort begannen die Arbeiten für die Aufstellung des Operations- und Aufmarschplanes. Dieser wurde dann Hitler vorgetragen und unter Berücksichtigung einer von ihm gewünschten Änderung genehmigt.

Nachdem die Operations- und Aufmarschanweisungen an die in Frage kommenden 2 Führer der Heeresgruppen und die 5 Armeeführer ausgegeben waren, fanden Besprechungen mit diesen über Einzelheiten statt, um deren Wünsche und Vorschläge zu hören.

Nach Ausbruch des Krieges verfolgte ich weiterhin die Gepflogenheit enger und dauernder Fühlungsnahme mit den Oberbefehlshabern der Heeresgruppen und Armeen, sowohl durch persönliche Besuche ihrer Hauptquartiere, als auch durch Telefon, Fernschreiber oder Radio. Auf diesem Wege war ich in der Lage ihren Rat und ihre Vorschläge während der Kampfhandlungen einzuholen. Es war in der Tat bestehende Üblichkeit und allgemeine Gepflogenheit der jeweiligen Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres mit ihren unterstellten Oberbefehlshaber in einem ständigen Meinungsaustausch zu bleiben.

Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres und sein Chef des Generalstabs standen in Verbindung mit den Heeresgruppen und durch diese oder auch unmittelbar mit den Armeen: durch Heeresgruppen bezgl. strategischer und taktischer Angelegenheiten;

unmittelbar hinsichtlich der Versorgung und Verwaltungsfragen in dem von diesen Armeen eroberten Gebiete. Eine Heeresgruppe hatte keine territoriale vollziehende Gewalt. Sie bestand aus einem verhältnismässig kleinen Stab, der sich nur mit militärischen Operationen befasste. In allen territorialen Angelegenheiten war es der Oberbefehlshaber der Armee und nicht der Heeresgruppe, der die vollziehende Gewalt ausübte.

gez. von Brauchitsch

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal WALTER von BRAUCHITSCH, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung vom 7. November 1945" (statement of 7 November 1945) consisting of two pages in the German language, and who in my presence also signed the attached "Ergänzung zu meiner Erklärung vom 7. November 1945" (supplement to my statement of 7 November 1945) consisting of one sheet written on both sides in German script, and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp

WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

H1143 – 0035

ERGÄNZUNG ZU MEINER ERKLÄRUNG VOM 7. NOVEMBER 1945.

Wenn Hitler sich entschlossen hatte die Erreichung seiner politischen Ziele durch einen militärischen Druck oder durch Einsatz der militärischen Machtmittel zu unterstützen erhielt der Ob.d.H., wenn er daran beteiligt war, zunächst in der Regel mündlich eine entsprechende Orientierung oder einen entsprechenden Befehl.

H1143-0036

Hierauf wurden im O.K.H. die Operations- und Aufmarchpläne bearbeitet. Nachdem sie in der Regel mündlich Hitler vorgetragen und von ihm genehmigt waren, erfolgte ein schriftlicher Befehl des O.K.W. an die Wehrmachtsteile.

Inzwischen war vom O.K.H. mit der Ausgabe der Operations- und Aufmarchpläne an die in Frage kommenden Heeresgruppen und Armeen begonnen worden. Einzelheiten der Operations- und Aufmarchpläne wurden vom O.K.H. mit den Heeresgruppen- und Armeeführern und ihren Chefs der Generalstäbe besprochen.

Während der Operationen stand das O.K.H., in einem dauerden Meinungsaustausch durch Fernsprecher, Funk und Kurier mit den Heeresgruppen. Der Ob.d.H. benutzte jede zeitliche Möglichkeit, um durch Aufsuchen der Heeresgruppen, Armeen und Truppenführern mit diesem in einem persönlichen Meinungsaustausch zu bleiben.

Im Kriege gegen Russland wurden Heeresgruppen- und Armeeführer wiederholt von Hitler einzeln zum Vortrage befohlen.

Die Befehle in allen Operations Angelegenheiten gingen vom O.K.H. an die Heeresgruppen, in allen Angelegenheiten des Nachschubes und der Vollziehenden Gewalt vom O.K.H. unmittelbar an die Armeen.

gez. von Brauchitsch

Exhibit U.S.A. 537
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.5
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1143 - 0037

STATEMENT

From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Saar and Ruhr, and Memel.

I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff and front officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety per cent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the political and economic loss resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity.

The at first (1933 - 35) secret and later unconcealed rearmament of Germany was welcomed by me. All officers of the army shared this attitude and therefore had no reason to oppose Hitler. Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.

After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.

When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer's speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the

army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign.

During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal recalls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.

(Signed) BLASKOWITZ 10.11.45

H1143 - 0038

CHART

(Initialed) Bl. 10.11.45



H1143-0039

H1143 - 0040

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him and an attached chart initialed by him, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 10th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

AFFIDAVIT No.5

ERKLÄRUNG

Seit 1919 und insbesondere seit 1924 nahmen drei wesentliche Territorialfragen die Aufmerksamkeit Deutschlands in Anspruch. Es waren dies die Fragen des polnischen Korridors, des Saar und Ruhrgebietes und des Memellandes.

Sowohl ich selbst, als auch die gesamte Gruppe deutscher Stabs- und Frontoffiziere glaubten, dass diese drei Fragen, unter welchen die Frage des polnischen Korridors besonders hervortrat, eines Tages gelöst werden müssten, nötigenfalls durch Waffengewalt. Ungefähr neunzig Prozent des deutschen Volkes teilten diese Ansicht mit den Offizieren bezüglich der polnischen Frage. Ein Krieg um die durch die Schaffung des polnischen Korridors entstandene politische und wirtschaftliche Einbusse auszugleichen und die Bedrohung des abgetrennten Ostpreussens, das von Polen und Litauen umfasst war, zu vermindern wurde als eine heilige Pflicht wenn auch bittere Notwendigkeit betrachtet.

Die anfangs (1933 - 35) geheime und späterhin offene Wiederaufrüstung Deutschlands wurde von mir begrüsst. Alle Offiziere des Heeres teilten diese Anschauung und hatten deshalb keinen Grund Hitler zu opponieren. Hitler brachte die Erfolge welche wir alle heiss ersehnten.

Nach dem Anschluss der Tschechoslowakei hofften wir, dass die polnische Frage nunmehr friedlich auf diplomatischen Wege gelöst werden würde, denn wir glaubten, dass diesmal Frankreich und England zur Hilfe ihres Alliierten kommen würden. In der Tat fühlten wir, dass die polnische Frage, wenn politische Massnahmen scheiterten, zum Kriege führen musste, d.h. nicht nur mit Polen selbst, sondern auch mit den Westmächten.

Als ich Mitte Juni vom OKH einen Befehl erhielt mich auf einen Angriff gegen Polen vorzubereiten, wusste ich dass dieser Krieg nunmehr in den Bereich der Möglichkeit rückte. Diese Feststellung wurde durch die Führeransprache am 22. August 1939 auf dem Obersalzberg nur noch betont und erschien nun als eine klare Tatsache. Zwischen Mitte Juni 1939 und dem 1.September 1939 nahmen meine bearbeitenden Stabsangehörigen an verschiedenen

H1143-0041

H1143 - 0042

Besprechungen teil, die zwischen dem OKH und der Heeresgruppe durchgeführt wurden. Während dieser Besprechungen wurden Dinge taktischer, strategischer und allgemeiner Natur besprochen, die mit meiner zukünftigen Stelle als Oberbefehlshaber der achten Armee während des geplanten polnischen Feldzuges zu tun hatten.

Während des polnischen Feldzuges, insbesondere während der Kutno Kämpfe, war ich wiederholt in Verbindung mit dem Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres und er sowie der Führer besuchten mein Hauptquartier. Es war überhaupt Gepflogenheit, dass von Zeit zu Zeit Oberbefehlshaber von Heeresgruppen und Armeen durch Telefon, Fernschreiber oder Funk sowohl als auch durch persönliche Vorladungen um Situationsberichte und Rat gefragt wurden. In der Tat wurden dann diese Frontoberbefehlshaber Berater beim OKH in ihrem Sachbereich, sodass die in der beiliegenden Skizze aufgeführten Dienststellen jene Gruppe umfassen, die der tatsächliche Beraterkreis des Oberkommandos der deutschen Wehrmacht war.

gez. BLASKOWITZ 10.11.45

SKIZZE

gez.El. 10.11.45



H1143-0043

H1143 - 0044

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him and an attached chart initialed by him, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 10th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143 - 0045

Exhibit U.S.A. 533
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.6
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff - - in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff.

The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the "National Defense" Section and was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement of 7 November (in the Army: "General Staff of the Army"; in the Air Force: "General Staff of the Air Force").

Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not worked out by the "Great General Staff" but by the Naval Staff.

(Signed) FRANZ HALDER

H1143-0046

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, ROBERT BENSON, Flight Lieutenant, Royal Air Force, 85862, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General FRANZ HALDER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him, and swore that the same was true on the 13th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Robert Benson
ROBERT BENSON
Fl.Lieut. R.A.F
85862

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN 0-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 6.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
0-385720

AFFIDAVIT No. 6

ERKLÄRUNG

Die wichtigste Abteilung im OKW war der Wehrmachtführungsstab - etwa in derselben Weise wie der Generalstab bei Herr und Luftwaffe und die Seekriegsleitung bei der Marine. Eine Reihe von Amtchefs in gleichem Range mit Jodl unterstanden Keitel, aber sie und ihre Ämter waren weniger wichtig und weniger einflussreich in Planung und Durchführung militärischer Angelegenheiten, als Jodl und Jodl's Stab.

Der Wehrmachtsführungsstab war in Abteilungen gegliedert. Von diesen war die Abteilung, welcher Warlimont als Chef vorstand, die wichtigste. Sie wurde Abteilung "Landesverteidigung" genannt und befasste sich in erster Linie mit der Ausarbeitung strategischer Fragen. Obwohl Warlimont die gleichen Dienstaufgaben anvertraut blieben, war er von 1941 an als Stellvertretender Chef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes bekannt.

Es bestand während des zweiten Weltkrieges kein vereinigter Generalstab ähnlich dem grossen Generalstab im ersten Weltkrieg.

Die Führungsfragen bei Feldheer und Luftwaffe bearbeitete die in meiner Erklärung vom 7. November beschriebene Gruppe höherer Offiziere (beim Feldheer "Generalstab des Heeres," bei der Luftwaffe "Generalstab der Luftwaffe").

Führungsfragen der Kriegsmarine sind auch im ersten Weltkrieg nicht vom "Grossen Generalstab" bearbeitet worden, sondern von der Marineleitung.

gez. FRANZ HALDER

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, ROBERT BENSON, Flight Lieutenant, Royal Air Force, 85862, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General FRANZ HALDER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him, and swore that the same was true on the 13th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Robert Benson
ROBERT BENSON
Fl.Lieut. RAF
85862

H1143 - 0047

Exhibit U.S.A. 534
Filed Jan 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.9
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

BERND VON BRAUCHITSCH

NURNBERG
16.11.45

SWORN STATEMENT

Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation "Befehlshaber" and from then on that of "Oberbefehlshaber". This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities which they previously had.

(Signed) BRAUCHITSCH

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel BERND on BRAUCHITSCH, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 20th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, CMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 9.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major CMC
O-385720

H1143 – 0048

H1143 - 0049

AFFIDAVIT No.9

BERND VON BRAUCHITSCH NUERNBERG DEN 16.11.45

EIDESSTATTLICHE ERKLAERUNG

Die Luftflottenchefs sind den Armeeoberbefehlshabern gleichzusetsen. Sie sind waehrend des Krieges keine Territorialbefehlshaber gewesen und uebten dementsprechend auch keine vollziehende Gewalt aus.

Sie waren die hoechsten Truppenvorgesetzten der ihnen unterstellten Luftwaffenverbaenden und dem Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe unmittelbar unterstellt.

Bis zum Sommer 44 fuehrten sie die Dienststellenbezeichnung "Befehlshaber", ab diesem Zeitpunkt die Dienststellenbezeichnung "Oberbefehlshaber". Hierdurch aenderte sich gegenueber der Vorzeit in ihrem Aufgaben- und Verantwortungsbereich nichts.

gez. BRAUCHITSCH

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel BERND von BRAUCHITSCH, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 20th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

Exhibit 557
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT 12
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SWORN STATEMENT

In the middle of May 1943, as far as I remember, the Chief of [illegible] of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was selected by Wagner because of my experience in matters of protocol to be sent to Heydrich for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.

The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.

The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:

1) in front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;

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2)	in rear operational areas:	in merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under the c[illegible] and functional control of the RSH[illegible];
3)	in rear Army areas:	arrangement as in 2;
4)	in areas of the civil administration in the East:	same as in the Reich.

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The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification.

The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network.

This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either "acting for" or "by order of" the OKH.

After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer's command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye.

Today I read the "Operational and Situational Report No.6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941)", as well as the "Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941". The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited "Comprehensive Report", which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective Oberbefehlshabers with Combat Group A was "in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, very close, in fact almost cordial" (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title "Summary of the Number of Executed Persons", particularly

from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as [illegible] to carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above-cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that during the secret oral discussion between Wagner and Heydrich the extensive future activity of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos within the combat elements of the Field Army was obviously discussed and delineated so as to include even planned mass executions. The close cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups cited above as taking place even in the first weeks of the Russian campaign makes me today give expression to my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance.

In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counter-intelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.

This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact delineation of the Fuehrer's command "to smash utterly all

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resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as possible", including even planned mass executions of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to march against Russia, about the full extent of the agreement.

(Signed) WALTER SCHELLENBERG
26. XI. 45

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared WALTER SCHELLENBERG, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of five pages in the German language with corrections initialled in the left margin by the same WALTER SCHELLENBERG and with each of the five pages initialled at the bottom by the same WALTER SCHELLENBERG, and who swore that the same was true on the 26th day of November 1945.

I further certify that the two reports cited on page 3 of the foregoing statement are documents contained in the official files of the Documentation Section of the Office of the U.S.Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany. I further certify that the document whose title is "Taetigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr. 6 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtszeit vom 1.- 31.10.1941)" is document No. R-102, and that the document bearing the title "Gesamtbericht der Einsatzgruppe A bis zum 15.Oktober 1941" is document No. L-180.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the foregoing is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No.12.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

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AFFIDAVIT No.12

EIDESSTATTLICHE ERKLAERUNG

Meiner Erinnerung nach verhandelte Mitte Mai 1941 der Chef des vierten Amtes des Reichssicherheitshauptamts (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller) im Namen des Chefs des Reichssicherheitshauptamts (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich) mit dem Generalquartiermeister des Heeres (General Wagner) ueber Fragen des Einsatzes der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes im Rahmen des Feldheeres beim bevorstehenden Feldzug gegen Russland. Wagner fand keinen Kontakt mit Mueller und daher bat Heydrich um Abstellung eines anderen Verhandlungspartners. Ich war damals Chef der Abteilung E im vierten Amt des RSHA unter dem Amtschef Mueller und wurde auf Grund meiner Protokolerfahrungen von Heydrich zu Wagner entsandt, um die entgueltige Vereinbarung zu formulieren. Laut meines Befehles sollte ich darauf achten, dass es in dieser Vereinbarung vorgesehen wurde, dass die verantwortlichen Heeresdienststellen zur voelligen Unterstuetzung aller Taetigkeiten der Einsatzgruppen und Einsatzkommandos der SIPO und des SD fest gebunden waeren. Ich habe mit Wagner das Problem dieses gegenseitigen Verhaeltnisses eingehend besprochen. Gemaess dieser Aussprache habe ich ihm dann einen ausgearbeiteten Vereinbarungsentwurf vorgelegt, der seine volle Billigung fand. Dieser Vereinbarungsentwurf wurde die Grundlage einer Abschlussbesprechung gegen Ende Mai 1941 zwischen Wagner und Heydrich.

Der Inhalt dieser Vereinbarung ist meiner Erinnerung nach ungefaehr folgender gewesen. Ihre Grundlage war der zu Eingang der Vereinbarung erwaehnte Fuehrerbefehl, dass die SIPO und der SD im Kampfverband des Feldheeres zum Einsatz gelange, mit der Aufgabe, jeden Widerstand in eroberten Frontgebieten beziehungsweise in eroberten rueckwaertigen Nachschubgebieten mit allen Mitteln schnellstens und vollkommen zu brechen. Alsdann wurden die einzelnen Raeume, in denen die SIPO und der SD eingesetzet werden und taetig sein sollten, festgelegt. Die einzelnen Einsatzgruppen waren dabei verteilt auf die zum Einsatz gelangenden Heeresgruppen, und die Einzelnen Einsatzkommandos auf die betreffenden zum Einsatz gelangenden Armeen.

Die Einsatzgruppen und Einsatzkommandos sollten im Einzelnen taetig werden

1) in den Frontgebieten: bei voelliger Unterstellung unter das Feldheer, taktisch-fachlich und truppendienstlich;

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2)	in den rueckwaertigen Operationsgebieten:	bei Unterstellung unter das Feldheer nur truppendienstlich, aber befehlsmaessig und fachlich unter das RSHA;
3)	in den rueckwaertigen Heeresgebieten:	Regelung wie unter 2;
4)	in den Gebieten der zivilen Ostverwaltung:	genau wie im Reich.

Die taktisch-fachliche Befehlsgewalt und die Verantwortlichkeit der Frontdienststellen des Feldheeres ueber die Einsatzkommandos wurde in der Vereinbarung in keiner Weise beschraenkt und daher bedurfte sie keiner weiteren Erlaeuterung.

Die Vereinbarung legte fest, dass die truppendienstliche Unterstellung nicht nur die disziplinaere Unterstellung umfasste, sondern auch die Verpflichtung der rueckwaertigen Dienststellen des Feldheeres auf Unterstuetzung der Einsatzgruppen und Einsatzkommandos in Fragen des Nachschubs (Benzin, Verpflegung, usw.) sowie auf Benuetzung des Nachrichtennetzes.

Diese Vereinbarung wurde in meiner Gegenwart von Heydrich und Wagner unterschrieben. Wagner unterschrieb sie entweder "in Vertretung" oder "im Auftrag" des Oberkommandos des Heeres.

Nach der Unterschriftleistung durch Wagner und Heydrich wurde ich von beiden Herren auf eine halbe Stunde aus dem Zimmer gebeten. Ich hoerte noch im Hinausgehen, wie sie sich beide darueber einig wurden, ueber den Ihnen beiden offenbar vorher persoenlich bekannten Fuehrerbefehl und ueber seine weitere Auslegung im Einzelnen unter vier Augen sprechen zu wollen. Nach der abgelaufenen halben Stunde wurde ich nur noch zu der Verabschiedung hereingerufen.

Ich habe heute den "Taetigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr.6 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtszeit vom 1.-31.10.1941)" gelesen, sowie den "Gesamtbericht der Einsatzgruppe A bis zum 15. Oktober 1941." Man sieht vom ganzen Inhalt dieser Berichte, dass die Taetigkeit der Einsatzgruppen und Einsatzkommandos der SIPO und des SD besonders darin lag, Massenvernichtungen von Juden, Kommunisten und anderen Widerstandselementen zu unternehmen und durchzufuehren. Man sieht auch aus dem oben erwaehnten "Gesamtbericht", der nicht mehr als die ersten vier Monate dieser Taetigkeit umfasst, dass die Zusammenarbeit der betreffenden

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Oberbefehlshaber mit der Einsatzgruppe A "im allgemeinen gut, in Einzelfaellen, wie z.B mit der Panzergruppe 4 unter Generaloberst Hoeppner, sehr eng, ja fast herzlich war" (Seite 1). Aus einer Anlage zu demselben Bericht mit dem Titel "Uebersicht ueber die Zahl der exekutierten Personen" geht es anschaulich hervor, besonders aus der Reihenfolge der Zahlen in den einzelnen der Reihe nach eroberten Gebieten, dass gleich vom Anbeginn des Vormarsches gegen Russland an die Totalitaet des Einsatzes der SIPO und des SD mit Massenvernichtungen aller Widerstandselemente in den Frontgebieten eingesetzt hat. Ich anerkenne die Glaubwuerdigkeit und Wahrhaftigkeit der beiden oben erwaehnten Berichte. Daher muss ich heute meiner festen Ueberzeugung Ausdruck geben, dass in der geheimen und muendlichen Auslegung zwischen Wagner und Heydrich die umfassende zukuenftige Taetigkeit der Einsatzgruppen und der Einsatzkommandos im Rahmen des Kampfverbandes des Feldheeres bis auf geplante Massenvernichtungen vermutlich eroertert und festgelegt worden ist. Die oben angefuehrte enge und schon in den ersten Wochen des russischen Feldzuges stattgefundene Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Feldheer und den Einsatzgruppen veranlasst mich heute meiner festen Ueberzeugung Ausdruck zu geben, dass die Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppen und Armeen, die im russischen Feldzug teilnehmen sollten, schon vor dem Beginn dieses Feldzuges von der weitgehenden zukuenftigen Aufgabe der Einsatzgruppen und Einsatzkommandos der SIPO und des SD bis auf geplante Massenvernichtungen von Juden, Kommunisten und allen anderen Widerstandselementen durch die gewoehnlichen Dienstwege des OKH genau informiert worden sind.

Anfang Juni 1941 hatte Wagner, gemeinsam mit Heydrich und dem Chef des Amts Ausland/Abwehr des OKW (Admiral Canaris), saemtliche Ic AO's und soweit ich mich erinnere, saemtliche Ic's aller Heeresgruppen, Armeen, Armeekorps und etlicher Divisionen, die in dem kommenden russischen Feldzug teilnehmen sollten, zu einer gemeinsamen Besprechung im OKW-Gebaeude in Berlin zusammengerufen. Ebenfalls anwesend waren zum groessten Teil die verantwortlichen Fuehrer der Einsatzgruppen und Einsatzkommandos der SIPO und des SD. Ich war auch dabei. Der wesentliche Inhalt und Zweck dieser Tagung war die Darstellung der militaerischen Planung gegen Russland und

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die Bekanntmachung der oben dargestellten Einzelheiten der zwischen Wagner und Heydrich getroffenen schriftlichen Vereinbarung.

Diese Gruppe von Ic AO's und Ic's blieb noch ein paar Tage in Berlin und wurde in mehreren Besprechungen, denen ich nicht beiwohnte, ueber die weiteren Einzelheiten des kommenden russischen Feldzuges eingehend unterrichtet. Ich nehme an, dass es sich in diesen Besprechungen um die genaue Festlegung des Fuehrerbefehls, "jeden Widerstand in eroberten Gebieten mit allen Mitteln schnellstens und vollkommen zu brechen", bis auf geplante Massenvernichtungen aller Widerstandselemente gehandelt hat. Sonst waere die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Feldheer und den Einsatzgruppen, die in ein paar Wochen aus den oben erwaehnten Akten klar zu sehen ist, vermutlich nicht zu erwarten gewesen. Auf alle Faelle ist daran kaum zu zweifeln, dass diese Ic AO's und Ic's ihre eigenen Chefs, einschliesslich aller Oberbefehlshaber von Heeresgruppen und Armeen, die gegen Russland marschieren sollten, sofort nach ihrer Rueckkehr von Berlin von dem vollen Umfang der Vereinbarung genauestens unterrichtet haben.

gez. WALTER SCHELLENBERG

26.XI. 1945

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN.O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared WALTER SCHELLENBERG, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of five pages in the German language with corrections initialled in the left margin by the same WALTER SCHELLENBERG and with each of the five pages initialled at the bottom by the same WALTER SCHELLENBERG, and who swore that the same was true on the 26th day of November 1945.

I further certify that the two reports cited on page 3 of the foregoing statement are documents contained in the official files of the Documentation Section of the Office of the U.S.Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany. I further certify that the document whose title is "Taetigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr.6 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtszeit vom 1.-31.10.1941)" is document No.R-102, and that the document bearing the title "Gesamtbericht der Einsatzgruppe A bis zum 15. Oktober 1941" is document No.L-180.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

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Exhibit USA 558
Filed Jan. 7, 1946.

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No. 13
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Nurnberg, 25 November 1945.

I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the [illegible] from the year 1941 to 1945.

Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.

Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler who sent police forces to handle this matter.

In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Jugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.

It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well-known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.

I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Goglein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about

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atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side.

(Signed) WILHELM SCHEIDT

Retired Captain of the Reserve

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Captain WILHELM SCHEIDT, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of three pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 26th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the foregoing is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 13

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143 - 0059

AFFIDAVIT No.13

Nuernberg, den 25.November 1945.

Ich, Wilhelm Scheidt, gehoerte vom Jahre 1941 bis 1945 der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht an.

Zur Frage des Partisanenkrieges erklaere ich, dass mir folgendes aus meiner Kenntnis der Akten des Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes sowie aus meinen Gespraechen mit Generalmajor Walter Scherff, dem Beauftragten des Fuehrers fuer die militaerische Geschichtschreibung, im Fuehrerhauptquartier erinnerlich ist:

Die Bekaempfung der Partisanen war urspruenglich eine Aufgabe des Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler gewesen, zu deren Loesung Polizeikraefte eingesetzt waren. Im Jahre 1942 und 43 nahm jedoch der Kampf mit den Partisanen einen solchen Umfang an, dass ihm auch die Wehrmachtfuehrung besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenken musste. In der Operationsabteilung des Heeres innerhalb des Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes erhielt ein besonderer Offizier die Bearbeitung des Kampfes gegen die Partisanen als Spezialaufgabe. Es erwies sich als noetig, dass auch mit Kraeften der Wehrmacht sowohl im russischen wie im jugoslawischen Raum grossangelegte Operationen zur Bekaempfung der Partisanen durchgefuehrt wurden. Die Tactigkeit der Partisanen drohte lange Zeit hindurch die lebenswichtigen Verbindungs- und Transportlinien der deutschen Wehrmacht abzuschneiden. Ueber die Anschlaege auf die Eisenbahnlinien im besetzten Russland wurde deshalb zum Beispiel eine monatliche Zusammenstellung herausgegeben, aus der hervorging, dass es sich allein im russischen Raum monatlich um jeweils 800 bis 1.000 Anschlaege handelte, denen unter anderem monatlich 200 bis 300 Lokomotiven zum Opfer fielen.

Es war eine allgemein bekannte Tatsache, dass der Partisanenkrieg von beiden Seiten mit Grausamkeit gefuehrt wurde. Auch war es bekannt, dass Repressalien gegen Geiseln und Ansiedlungen, deren Bewohner verdaechtig waren, Partisanen zu sein oder solche unterstuetzt zu haben, angewandt wurden. Es steht ausser Frage, dass diese Tatsachen den fuehrenden Offizieren im WFSt. und im Generalstab des Heeres bekannt gewesen sein muessen. Es war weiterhin bekannt, dass Hitler der Ansicht war, dass im Kampf gegen die Partisanen nur die Anwendung von grausamen Abschreckungs-

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strafen erfolgreich sein koenne.

Ich erinnere mich, dass der SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein anlaesslich des polnischen Aufstandes in Warschau den Generaloberst Guderian und Jodl Einzelheiten ueber die Grausamkeiten der russischen SS-Brigade Kaminski berichtete, welche auf deutscher Seite kämpfte.

gez. WILHELM SCHEIDT

Rittmeister d.R.a.D.

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Captain WILHELM SCHEIDT, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of three pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 26th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

H1143 - 0061

Exhibit USA 559
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT NO. 15
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

8 December 1945

As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.

At the beginning in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.

The number of enemy dead mentionedin official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the orderfrom highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans.

(signed) ROETTIGER

STATEMENT

Supplementary to my above declaration of 8 December 1945, I declare: As I stated orally on 28 November 1945 my then Commander in Chief of the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.

Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object by peaceful means of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and them from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.

(signed) ROETTIGER

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CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General der Panzertruppen HANS ROETTIGER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 8th day of December 1945.

(signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain Cav
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgement of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 15.

(signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143-0064

AFFIDAVIT No.15

ERKLAERUNG

8. DEC 1945

Als Chef des Genst. der 4. Armee vom Mai 1942 bis Juni 1943, zu der auch spaeterhin das Gebiet der 9. Armee trat, hatte ich mehrfach Gelegenheit mich mit der Bandenbekaempfung dienstlich zu befassen. Fuer die Durchfuehrung dieser Kampfhandlungen war fuer die Truppe von hoechster Stelle, wie z.B. auch vom Oberkommando des Heeres angeordnet, mit schaerfsten Mitteln durchzugreifen. Diese Kampfhandlungen wurden mit Truppen der Heeresgruppe und der Armee, wie z.B. Sicherungsbataillonen durchgefuehrt.

Anfangs wurden gemaess den auf dem Dienstwege gegebenen Befehlen nur wenige Gefangenen gemacht. Gemaess Befehl wurden Juden, politische Kommissare und Agenten dem SD uebergeben.

Die in den offiziellen Berichten erwaehnten Gefallenen des Feindes waren sehr gross gegenueber unseren eigenen Gefallenen.

Ich bin erst jetzt auf Grund der mir vorgelegten Dokumente zu der Erkenntnis gekommen, dass mit der Anordnung zur schaerfsten Durchfuehrung des Bandenkampfes von hoechster Stelle moeglicherweise im Endziel der Zweck verfolgt wurde, den militaerischen Bandenkampf des Heeres auch dazu auszunutzen, die ruecksichtslose Liquidierung des Judentums und anderer unerwuenschter Elemente zu ermoeglichen.

gez. RÖTTIGER.

In Ergaenzung meiner ersten Erklaerung vom 8.12.45 erklaere ich:

Wie ich auch in meiner muendlichen Aussage am 28.11.45 betont habe, hat mein damaliger Oberbefehlshaber der 4. Armee die Truppe mehrfach daraufhin gewiesen, den Bandenkampf nicht haerter zu fuehren, als es die jeweilige Lage tatsaechlich erfoerderte. Der Kampf sollte nur dann bis zur Vernichtung des Gegners gefuehrt werden, wenn alle Versuche, ihn zur Uebergabe zu veranlassen fehl schluegen. Abgesehen von humanen Gruenden hatten wir selbst eine Interesse daran, Gefangene zu machen, da sehr viele von diesen sehr gut als Angehoerige von freiwilligen landeseigenen

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Bandenbekaempfungstruppen zu verwenden waren.

Neben der notwendigen aktiven Bandenbekaempfung wurde immerfort propagandistisch auf die Banden und auch auf die Bevoelkerung eingewirkt, um diese mit guetlichen Mitteln dazu zu veranlassen, von dem Bandenunwesen abzulassen. So wurden z.B. auch die Frauen immer wieder aufgefordert, ihre Maenner aus dem Busch zu holen oder sie sonstwie von dem Eintritt in die Banden abzuhalten. Diese Propagandaarbeit hatte auch gute Erfolge. So war das Gebiet der 4. Armee im Fruehjahr 1943 fast so gut wie bandenfrei. Lediglich an den Grenzen machten sich damals voruebergehend Banden bemerkbar als diese aus Nachbargebieten in das Gebiet der 4. Armee hinueberwechselten. Die Armee musste daher auch Sicherungskraefte an die suedl. Nachbararmee auf Befehl der Heeresgruppe Mitte abgeben.

gez. RÖTTIGER

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General der Panzertruppen HANS ROETTIGER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 8th day of December 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

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Exhibit USA 560
Filed Jan. 1, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.16
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.

(Signed) ROETTIGER

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General HANS ROETTIGER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 28th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No.16.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143 - 0067

AFFIDAVIT No.16

ERKLÄRUNG

Während meiner Dienstzeit in 1942/3 als Chef der 4ten Armee der Heeresgruppe Mitte waren SD Einheiten am Anfang zugeteilt, um angeblich Abwehrdienste im Frontgebiet der Armee zu liesten. Es stellte sich heraus, dass diese SD Einheiten unter der ansässigen Zivilbevölkerung grosse Aufregung verursachten, die zur Folge hatte, dass mein Vorgesetzter den Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe, Generalfeldmarschall v.Kluge, darum bat, die SD Einheiten aus dem Frontgebiet zurückzukommandieren, was dann unmittelbar geschah. Der Grund dafür lag vor allen Dingen darin, dass die Ausschweifungen der SD Einheiten durch Executionen von Juden und anderer Personen Ausmasse annahmen, dass eine Bedrohung für die Sicherheit der Armee in ihrem Kampfgebiet durch die empörte Zivilbevölkerung bestand. Obwohl man allgemein über die Sonder-Aufgaben der SD Einheiten bescheid wusste und dies ja auch anscheinend mit Wissen der obersten Wehrmachtführung geschah, traten wir deren Methoden weitmöglichst entgegen, da die Gefährdung der eigenen Truppe bestand.

gez. ROETTIGER

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General HANS ROETTIGER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 28th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

Exhibit USA 56
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.17
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Commando Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the army groups were likewise under the latter's command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944 mostly through the intervention of General-quartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.

The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Drakonian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was

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absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Hitler's desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it it clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.

(Signed) ERNST RODE

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared ERNST RODE, Major General of Police and Waffen-SS, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 30th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 17.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143 - 0070

AFFIDAVIT No.17

ERKLÄRUNG

Ich, ERNST RODE, war früher der Chef des Kommandestabes RFSS und übernahm diesen Posten im Frühjahr 1943 als Nachfolger des früheren SS Obergruppenfuehrers Kurt Knoblauch. Mein letzter Dienstgrade war Generalmajor der Polizei und Waffen SS, Meine Aufgabe war, den jeweiligen Höheren SS und Polizeiführern in der Bandenkampfbekampfung die erforderlichen Kräfte zuzuführen und die Unterstützung durch Kräfte des Heeres sicherzustellen. Dies geschah in unmittelbaren Besprechungen mit den führenden Offizieren des W.F.St. im OKW und dem O.K.H. also mit den Generälen Warlimont, v.Buttlar, mit den Generalobersten Guderian und Zeitzler, General Heusinger, später General Wenk, Oberst Graf Kielmannsegg, später Oberst v. Bonin. Da im Operationsgebiet auch die Bandenbekampfung unter dem ausschlies lichen Befehl des betreffenden Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe stand (wie z.B. in der H.Gr. Mitte bei Feldmarschall Kluge später Busch) und die Polizeitruppen meist in den Reichkommissariaten unabkömmlich waren, lag die Kampfführung fast immer gänzlich in den Händen des Heeres. Entsprechend geschah auch die Befehlsgebung nicht etwa durch Himmler, sondern duch das OKH. Derselben Befehlsgebung waren auch die SS und Polizeitruppen unterworfen, die zur Unterstützung der Heeresgruppen aus den Reichskommisariaten in das Operationsgebiet abgestellt waren. Diese Abstellung geschah zum Nachteile der Bandenbekämpfung in den Reichskommisariaten sehr oft. Die Führung in den einzelren Unternehmungeu lag gemaess einer ausdruecklichen Vereinbarung Himmlers mit OKW und OKH immer in Händen desjenigen Truppenführers der über das grösste Truppenkontingent verfügte. Es konnte also passieren, dass ein General des Heeres SS und Polizei unterstellt bekam, umgekehrt aber auch das einem SS und Polizeigeneral Truppen des Heeres unterstellt wurden. Bandenbekämpfung im Operations gebiet konnte von Hitler niemals befohlen werden. Dieses konnte nur durch mich beim OKH angeregt werden, meist auf Veranlassung das Generalquartiermeisters Wagner bis 1944, oder des Staatssekretäres Ganzenmüller. Das OKH gab dann der in Frage kommenden Heeresgruppe die entsprechenden Befehle zur Durchführung.

Die Härte und Grausamkeit mit der der an sich heimtückische Bandenkampf vom Russen geführt wurde, hatte bereits im Jahre 1942 zu drakonischen Befehlen für die Kampfführung seitens Hitlers geführt. Diese Befehls die

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durch OKW und OKH der Truppe bekannt gegeben wurden, galten selbstverständlich genau so für die Truppen des Heeres als wie diejenigen der SS und Polizei. Ihre Kampfführung hat sich in der Form bestimmt in nichts unterschieden. Der Soldat des Heeres war genau so verbittert gegen den Fiend wie der Soldat der SS und Polizei. Infolge dieser Verbitterung wurden die Befehle rücksichtslos von beiden Seiten durchgeführt, was dem Wunsche oder Absichten Hitlers ja auch entsprach. Als Beweis kann man ja den Befehl des OKW und OKH anfuehren der bestimmte, dass alle gefangenen Bandenangehörigen wie z.B. Juden, Agenten und politische Kommissare von der Truppe unverzüglich dem S.D. zwecks Sonderbehandlung zu übergeben sind. Ausserdem enthielt dieser Befehl damals die Anordnung, dass im Bandenkampf keinerlei Gefangene, ausser den obengenannten zu machen sind. Das der Bandenkampf auch von den Truppen des Heeres gnadenlos bis aufs Messer geführt wurde, weiss ich aus Unterhaltungen mit Truppenführern des Heeres, z.B. General Herzog, Komandeur des XXXVIII A.K. und sienes Chefs, Oberst i.G. Pamberg, die mir meine Auffassung bestätigten. Heute ist es mir klar, dass der Bandenkampf allmählich der Vorwand wurde das Judentum und Slaventum systematisch auszurotten.

gez. ERNST RODE

OBERURSEL:

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared ERNST RODE Major General of Police and Waffen-SS, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 30th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

Exhibit USA 563
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.18
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death, as victims of so-called "purifications", is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.

(Signed) ERNST RODE

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared ERNST RODE, Major General of Police and Waffen-SS, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 30th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 18.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. Neuland
Major QMC
O-385720

H1143-0072

AFFIDAVIT No. 18

ERKLAERUNG.

Soweit mir bekannt ist, waren die S.D. Einsatzgruppen bei den einzelnen Heeresgruppen diesen vollunterstellt, d.h. taktisch sowohl auch in jeder anderen Weise. Den Oberbefehlshabern waren deshalb die Aufgaben und Arbeitsmethoden dieser Einheiten voellig bekannt. Sie haben die Aufgaben und Arbeitsmethoden gebilligt da sie ja anscheinend niemals dagegen Front gemacht haben. Dass also der S.D. ueberwiegend Gefangene wie Juden, Agenten, Kommissare genau so dem grausamen Tode geweiht waren wie Opfer sogenannter "Saeuberungsaktionen" ist ein Beweis dafuer, dass die Exekutionen ihr Einverstaendniss gehabt hatten, ausserdem war ja auch dies im Sinne der politischen und militaerischen hoechsten Fuehrung. Ueber diese Methoden, die von der Masse der SS und Polizeioffiziere genau so abgelehnt wurden, wie wohl von der Masse der Heeresoffiziere, ist bei Besprechungen im OKW und OKH natuerlich des oefteren die Rede in meiner Beisein gewesen. Ich habe bei solchen Gelegenheiten immer darauf hingewiesen, dass es ja in der Befehlsgewalt der Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppen gelegen haette, dagegen sich aufzulehnen. Ich bin der festen Ueberzeugung dass ein energischer einheitlicher Protest aller Feldmarschaelle eine Aenderung der Aufgaben und Methoden mit sich gebracht haette. Die Ansicht dass noch rigorose Oberbefehlshaber innen bei ihrer Abberufung dann gefolgt waeren, ist meines Erachtens, falls dies geltend gemacht werden sollte, eine theoretische sogar feige Ausrede.

gez. ERNST RODE

H1143-0073

Oberursel:

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-451231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared ERNST RODE, Major General of Police and Waffen-SS to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 30th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

Exhibit USA 564
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.20
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.

All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.

During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.

2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the

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Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.

(Signed) HEUSINGER,
Generalleutnant.

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General HEUSINGER to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 1st day of December 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared in the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 20.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

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AFFIDAVIT No.20

ERKLÄRUNG

1) Von Beginn des Krieges 1939 bis Herbst 1940 war ich ia der Operationsabteilung im O.K.H., vom Herbst 1940 bis 20.7.1944 Chef der Operationsabteilung im O.K.H.

Mit der Übernahme des Oberbefehls über das Heer übertrug Hitler dem Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres die Beratung in allen Führungsfragen des russischen Kriegsschauplatzes.

Damit war für alle Fragen innerhalb des Operationsgebietes im Osten der Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres zuständig, für alle Fragen ausserhalb des Operationsgebietes das O.K.W., zum Beispiel im allgemeinen für alle Truppen, die in den Reichskommissariaten lagen. (Sicherungsverbände, SS Einheiten, Polizei).

Alle Polizei- und SS Verbände in den Reichskommissariaten unterstanden ausserdem dem Reichsführer SS. Wenn es erforderlich wurde, solche Verbände in das Operationsgebiet zu verlegen, bedurfte es dazu eines Befehls des Chefs O.K.W. Im umgekehrten Falle wurde, nach Einverständnis des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres, eine entsprechende Verlegung von vorn nach hinten durch das O.K.W. angeordnet.

Im allgemeinen führten bei Bandenunternehmungen die höheren SS- und Polizeiführer das kommando. Waren in einzelnen Fällen stärkere Heereseinheiten innerhalb des Operationsgebietes neben des SS- und Polizeiverbänden eingesetzt, so konnte in solchen Fällen ein höherer Befehlshaber des Heeres als Führer des Unternehmens bestimmt werden.

Bei Bandenunternehmungen innerhalb des Operationsgebietes waren die zu dem Unternehmen eingesetzten gesamten Kräfte dem Oberbefehlshaber der betr. Heeresgruppe unterstellt.

2). Die Befehle über die Art der Durchführung der Bandenbekämpfung (Methoden) wurden auf Anordnung Hitlers, wohl nach Besprechungen mit Himmler, durch das O.K.W. (Keitel) dem O.K.H. gegeben; das O.K.H. war nur für die Weitergabe dieser Befehle an die Heeresgruppen verantwortlich, wie z.B. die Befehle über die Behandlung von Kommissaren, Kommunisten; die Anweisung über die Art der kriegsgerichtlichen Ahndung von Vergehen Heeresangehöriger gegen die Bevölkerung sowie die Richtlinien über Vergeltungsmassnahmen gegen die Einwohner.

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3.) Die Bearbeitung aller Fragen der Behandlung der Bevölkerung sowie der Bandenbekämpfung im Operationsgebiet, in Ausführung der Befehle des O.K.W., lag im O.K.H. im Arbeitsbereich des Generalquartiermeisters.

4) Es war schon immer meine persönliche Ansicht, dass die Behandlung der Zivilbevölkerung im Operationsgebiet und die Methoden der Bandenbekämpfung im Operationsgebiet der obersten politischen und militärischen Führung eine willkommene Gelegenheit bot, ihre Ziele durchzuführen, nämlich die systematische Reduzierung des Slaven- und Judentums. Ganz abgesehen davon habe ich immer diese grausamen Methoden als eine militärische Torheit angesehen, da sie dazu beitrugen, den Kampf der Truppe gegen den Feind unnötig zu erschweren.

gez.

OBERURSEL:

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklärung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 1st day of December 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Major CAV
O-454231

Exhibit USA 565
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF AFFIDAVIT No.24
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

STATEMENT

At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the Commanding General of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.

(Signed) BOGISLAV v. BONIN
Colonel

1 December 1945

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel v. BONIN to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 1st day of December 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (The above acknowledgment of oath appeared on the original in English)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT

I, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Affidavit No. 24.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
O-454231

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AFFIDAVIT No. 24

ERKLAERUNG

Ich war zu Beginn des russischen Feldzuges erster Generalstabsoffizier der 17ten Panzerdivision, die noerdlich Brest-Litowsk ueber den Bug anzugreifen hatte. Ganz kurz vor Beginn des Angriffs erhielt meine Division einen schriftlichen Fuehrerbefehl vom OKW auf dem Dienstwege. In diesem Befehl war angeordnet, dass russische Kommissare bei Gefangennahme ohne gerichtliches Verfahren sofort und rucksichtslos zu erschiessen waeren. Dieser Befehl galt fuer alle Einheiten des Ostheeres. Obwohl der Befehl bis herunter zu den Kompanien bekanntgegeben werden sollte, hat der Kommandierende General des XXXVIII Panzerkorps (General der Panzertruppen Lemelsen) die Bekanntgabe an die Truppe verboten, weil dieser Befehl nach seiner Auffassung in militaerischer und moralischer Hinsicht untragbar schien.

(Signed) Bogislav v. BONIN
Colonel

1 December 1945

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, PAUL A. NEULAND, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel v. BONIN, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 1st day of December 1945.

(Signed) Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major QMC
O-385720

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[illegible]

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GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND GROUP I

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